A fiscal stimulus with deep habits and optimal monetary policy by Cantore, C. M. et al.
Cantore, C. M., Levine, P., Melina, G. & Yang, B. (2012). A fiscal stimulus with deep habits and 
optimal monetary policy. Economics Letters, 117(1), pp. 348-353. doi: 
10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.051 
City Research Online
Original citation: Cantore, C. M., Levine, P., Melina, G. & Yang, B. (2012). A fiscal stimulus with 
deep habits and optimal monetary policy. Economics Letters, 117(1), pp. 348-353. doi: 
10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.051 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/3775/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
A Fiscal Stimulus with Deep Habits and Optimal
Monetary Policy
Cristiano Cantore
School of Economics
University of Surrey
Paul Levine
School Economics
University of Surrey
Giovanni Melina
∗
School of Economics
University of Surrey
Bo Yang
School of Economics
University of Surrey
First version: February 8, 2012
This version: May 11, 2012
Abstract
A New-Keynesian model with deep habits and optimal monetary policy delivers a larger-than-one mul-
tiplier and consumption crowding-in. Optimized Taylor-type rules dominate a conventional Taylor rule.
Consumption is crowded out if the Taylor rule is sub-optimal or if commitment is absent.
JEL classification: E30, E62.
Keywords: Deep habits, Optimal monetary policy, Price-level rule.
∗Corresponding author at: University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, UK. Tel.: +44 1483689924; fax: +44 1483689548. E-
mail addresses: c.cantore@surrey.ac.uk (C. Cantore), p.levine@surrey.ac.uk (P. Levine), g.melina@surrey.ac.uk (G. Melina),
b.yang@surrey.ac.uk (B. Yang).
1 Introduction
The efficacy of a fiscal stimulus remains a controversial issue in applied macroeconomics. In particular
the range of empirical government spending multipliers is wide – Ramey (2011) surveys the literature and
argues that this is between 0.8 and 1.5 – and the sign of the effect on private consumption is controversial.
In fact, part of the empirical literature finds evidence for a crowding-out of consumption, while many
Structural Vector-Autoregressions (SVARs) provide evidence for a crowding-in effect. Canonical Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models typically predict fiscal multipliers well below the empirical
range and the crowding-out of private consumption.
A modelling device that has been used to obtain the consumption crowding-in and higher fiscal multi-
pliers in Real Business Cycle (RBC) models is the assumption that external ‘deep habits’ à la Ravn et al.
(2006) are formed in private and public consumption, i.e. habits on the average consumption level of each
variety of goods. Jacob (2012) shows that in a New-Keynesian (NK) model with deep habits, increasing
degrees of price stickiness soften the expansionary effects of a fiscal stimulus and may overturn the results
obtainable in a RBC model.
This paper also investigates these issues in a NKmodel with deep habits but pays particular attention to
the subtle interactions between fiscal and monetary policy that determine the outcome of a fiscal stimulus.
In particular, we study a boost to government spending alongside a number of possible interest rate
policies: first, the welfare-optimal (Ramsey) policy; second, a time-consistent policy; third, a conventional
Taylor interest rate rule which prescribes an immediate and strong response to the output gap; fourth,
an empirically based rule with a much weaker response to output; and finally an optimized simple Taylor
type rule (of which a price-level rule is a special case) that turns out to closely mimic the optimal policy.1
2 Model
The model is a standard NK model with Rotemberg price stickiness and convex investment adjustment
costs augmented with deep habit formation. It can be considered as an extension of the model employed
by Jacob (2012) given that it also includes investment.2
1In the companion working paper version of this article we also examine the outcome of these simple rules with a zero
lower bound constraint for an initial period.
2To retain a sharp focus on the issue of deep habit we abstract from unemployment. A number of recent papers examine
fiscal multipliers having introduced Mortensen-Pissarides search-matching frictions into otherwise standard NK models (but
without deep habit) – see Campolmi et al. (2011); Monacelli et al. (2010).
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2.1 Households
A continuum of identical households j ∈ [0, 1] has preferences over differentiated consumption varieties
i ∈ [0, 1]. Following Ravn et al. (2006), households exhibit external deep habit formation in consumption,
i.e. on the average consumption level of each variety of good. Their optimisation problem is
max
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(
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is a composite of habit-adjusted differen-
tiated private and public consumption goods similar to that in Pappa (2009), and Hjt are hours of work.
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where θc ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of deep habit formation on each variety, and Scit−1 denotes the stock of
habit in the consumption of good i, which evolves over time according to
Scit = ϱ
cScit−1 + (1− ϱ
c)Cit, (4)
where ϱc ∈ (0, 1) implies persistence. The optimal level of demand for each variety, Cjit, for a given
composite is obtained by minimizing total expenditure
´ 1
0 PitC
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is the nominal price index and η is the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution. Multiplying (5) by Pit and integrating, real consumption expenditure C
j
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be written as a function of the consumption composite and the stock of habit: Cjt = (X
c
t )
j + Ωt, where
2
Ωt ≡ θ
c
´ 1
0
Pit
Pt
Scit−1di. Households hold K
j
t capital holdings, evolving according to (2) where δ is the
capital depreciation rate, Ijt is investment, and S(·) represents an investment adjustment cost satisfying
S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) > 0. Investment is also a composite of goods, i.e. Ijt =
[´ 1
0
(
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,
but does not feature habit formation. Expenditure minimisation leads to the optimal level of demand of
private investment goods for each variety i:
Ijit =
(
Pit
Pt
)
−η
Ijt . (6)
Households buy consumption goods, Cjt , invest in investment goods, I
j
t , and nominal bond holdings, B
j
t ,
receive the hourly wage, Wt, the rental rate of capital, R
K
t , the return on nominal bond holdings, Rt, and
firms’ profits,
´ 1
0 Jitdi; and pay lump-sum taxes Tt.
The first-order condition (FOC) with respect to (w.r.t.) the private consumption composite (Xct )
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2.2 Government
As in Ravn et al. (2006) deep habits are present also in government consumption.3 In each period t, the
government allocates spending PtGt over differentiated goods sold by retailers in a monopolistic market
to maximize the quantity of a habit-adjusted composite good:
Xgt =
[ˆ 1
0
(Git − θ
gSgit−1)
1− 1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
,
3This can be justified by assuming that households derive habits also on consumption of government provided goods. One
can also argue that public goods are local in nature and households care about the provision of individual public goods in
their own constituency relative to others; or that procurement relationships are formed between government and firms.
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subject to the budget constraint
´ 1
0 PitGitdi ≤ PtGt, where θ
g is the degree of deep habit formation in
government spending and Sgit−1 denotes the stock of habits for this expenditure, which evolves as:
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g)Git, (7)
and exhibits persistence ρg. At the optimum
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Aggregate real government consumption, Gt, is an autoregressive process
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where ρG is an autoregressive parameter and ϵ
g
t is a mean zero, i.i.d. random shock with standard deviation
σG. The government budget constraint is simply Gt = Tt.
2.3 Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] rents capital, Kit, and hires labour,
Hit to produce differentiated goods Yit with convex technology F (Hit,Kit), which are sold at price Pit.
Firms face quadratic price adjustment costs ξ2
(
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)2
Yt, as in Rotemberg (1982) – where parameter
ξ measures the degree of price stickiness – and maximize the following flow of discounted profits:
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where FC are fixed production costs, set to ensure that the free entry condition of long-run zero profits is
satisfied. The corresponding first-order conditions for this problem are:
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Variables MCt, ν
c
t , λ
c
t , ν
g
t , λ
g
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (10), (5), (4), (8)
and (7) respectively. In particular, MCt is the shadow value of output and represents the firm’s real
marginal cost.
2.4 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is set either (i) optimally as the solution to a Ramsey problem, in which the mone-
tary authority maximizes households’ welfare or (ii) to be welfare-optimal subject to a time-consistency
constraint or (iii) according to a Taylor-type interest-rate rule:
log
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)
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[
ρpi log
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)
+ ρy log
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)]
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where ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter and ρpi and ρy are the monetary responses to inflation
and the ‘output gap’, Yt
Y¯
, where Y¯ is the deterministic steady state. 4 or (iv) as a price-level rule:
log
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)
= log
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)
+ ρy log
(
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)
; (12)
4However, strictly speaking the output gap in the original Taylor rule is Yt
Y ∗
t
where Y ∗t is the flexi-price output. The former
type of rule has the advantage that it is readily observed, so for the most part the rules examined take this form. However
we compare the two forms at the end of the paper.
5
Both sub-optimal and welfare-optimal forms of these simple rules are examined.
2.5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets clear. The resource constraint completes the model:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +
ξ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
Yt.
3 Functional forms
The utility function specializes as U(Xt, 1 − Ht) =
h
X
(1−ϱ)
t (1−Ht)
ϱ
i1−σc
−1
1−σc
, where σc > 0 is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, and ϱ determines the weight of leisure and the consumption composite in agents’
utility. The consumption composite in turn is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of private and public consumption
with νx representing the share of private consumption in the aggregate. Investment adjustment costs are
quadratic: S
(
It
It−1
)
= γ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
, γ > 0, while the production function is Cobb-Douglas: F (Ht,Kt) =
(AtHt)
αK1−αt , where At is a labour-augmenting technology shock and α represents the labour share of
income.
4 Parameter choice
Most parameter values are taken directly from the calibration exercise of Ravn et al. (2006): β = 0.9902,
η = 5.3, δ = 0.0253, σc = 2, θ
c = θg = 0.86, ρc = ρg = 0.85, ρG = 0.9. Parameters ϱ is set at the
steady state to target h = 0.33 and νx to make G/Y = 0.20 welfare-optimal, the labor share of income
α = 0.67, and the investment adjustment cost parameter γ = 5 as estimated by Christiano et al. (2005).
The Rotemberg parameter ξ is set equal to 25.304, which corresponds to Calvo contracts of an average
duration of 3 quarters. For the conventional Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) there is no persistence (ρr = 0) and
ρy = 0.5. Estimated Taylor rules typically reveal considerable persistence and a less aggressive response
to output: we choose an empirical rule from Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW) where ρr = 0.81, ρpi = 2.04,
ρy = 0.08. The ‘quasi-empirical’ rule is a compromise, i.e., the same ρr and ρpi, but ρy = 0.5 as in the
conventional Taylor rule.
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5 Results
We report the impulse responses to a government expenditure shock of size 1 percent of steady-state
output to be able to interpret the output response as a fiscal multiplier.
Before proceeding to the main results in a NK model, Figure 1 examines this fiscal stimulus in its
flexi-price core. The main feature of Ravn et al. (2006) is borne out by these impulse responses: in the
absence of deep habits the multiplier is well below unity, but when deep habits are added, the multiplier
is over 2, brought about by a reduction in the mark-up. Investment and consumption are now crowded in
rather than crowded out. Demand for labour rises bringing about a substantial increase in the real wage
and hours worked.
Turning to the NK model with monetary policy, Table 1 reports the rules set out in Section 2.4
and welfare outcomes compared with the optimal policy.5 To compute welfare-optimal policy subject to
constraints in the case of time-consistent and optimized simple rules, we employ a linear quadratic approach
as for example in Woodford (2003, Section 6.5) and Levine et al. (2008b). In the chosen environment the
steady state is distorted by the price mark-up under monopolistic competition and external deep habits
and we employ a numerical procedure to carry out an accurate LQ approximation for this case.6 We do
not assume taxation policy is in place to remove steady-state inefficiency, but even if we did the fiscal
shock itself is inefficient since the model is calibrated so that the observed share of government spending
is optimal. With either inefficient shocks or a distorted steady state it is now well-established in the
literature that using monetary policy alone, perfect stabilization (keeping prices stable and real outcomes
at their flexi-price level) is not optimal.7
There are four sources of forward-looking behaviour in our model: the Euler consumption equation, in-
vestment, and habit in both consumption and government services. This feature introduces a considerable
degree of time inconsistency into the optimal Ramsey policy as can be seen by the substantial welfare loss
in percentage terms if the monetary authority cannot commit to some form of interest rate rule. Our op-
timized simple rule turns out to be a quasi-price-level rule is only slightly welfare-superior to an optimized
price-level rule; both come very close (well below 1%) to mimicking the welfare outcome of optimal policy.
5See Levine et al. (2008a) for details of these three monetary policy regimes. Note that these optimized simple rules
are shock-dependent and here only apply to a fiscal shock with the assumed persistence. In a stochastic environment facing
many shocks they need to be redesigned and will be dependent on the relative persistence and variances of all shocks. It
then becomes important to estimate the model, including the properties of the shocks, before proceeding to the design of
such rules.
6Leith et al. (2012) show that the distortion generated by external deep habits create particularly strong trade-offs for
optimal monetary policy.
7Woodford (2003, Section 6.5) employs a simple NK model to demonstrate this.
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Rule [ρr, ρθ, ρy] Welfare Loss (%)
Optimal (Ramsey) not applicable 0
Time Consistent (TCT) not applicable 197
Conventional Taylor [0, 1.5, 0.50] 76.6
Empirical Taylor (SW) [0.81, 2.04, 0.08] 8.0
Quasi-Empirical Taylor [0.81, 2.04, 0.50] 17.6
Optimized Simple [0.95, 0.099, 0.000] 0.22
Optimized Price Level [1.00, 0.0064, 0] 0.37
Notes: The welfare loss is reported as a % increase of that under optimal policy. For integral simple rules
with ρr = 1, the rule is expressed as log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ ρpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
.
Table 1: Optimal and ad hoc Monetary Rules Compared
As discussed before, a conventional Taylor rule involves an instantaneous and over-aggressive response to
output compared with optimized rules, resulting in a significant welfare loss. The estimated empirical
rule, by contrast, is much closer to being welfare-optimal whilst the quasi-empirical rule is somewhere in
between.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions (equivalent to fiscal multipliers) to a fiscal shock when
monetary policy is either ex ante optimal, time-consistent or conducted using either the optimized or
the conventional Taylor simple commitment rule reported in Table 1. We see that the model delivers a
fiscal multiplier above one for a prolonged period and the crowding-in effect on private consumption if the
monetary authority can commit to some ex ante optimal rule. Comparing Figures 1 and 2 it is interesting
to note that the ex ante optimal commitment and flexi-price outcomes are different, the reason being the
non-optimality of perfect stabilization, as discussed. In particular, the fiscal multiplier is slightly smaller
than in the flexi-price case. If it cannot commit, then the model provides some support for fiscal stimulus
pessimism with a crowding-out effect on private consumption. The same applies to a fiscal stimulus
alongside the conventional Taylor rule.
Finally we re-examine the optimized simple rule using Taylor’s original definition of the output gap
Yt
Y ∗t
where Y ∗t is the flexi-price output. Figure 3 and 4 compare non-optimal and optimized forms. We
have seen from Figures 1 and 2 that the fiscal multiplier is higher for a flexi-price compared with the NK
model, which is in line with the point made by Jacob (2012). It follows that the output gap falls calling for
a ceteris paribus decrease in the nominal interest rate with non-optimal rules. As a result, consumption
is crowded in also under the non-optimal Taylor rule (Figure 3). This rule tends to stabilize both the
output gap and inflation. However, this is not optimal for the reasons discussed earlier. In fact, when the
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two types of rules are designed to be optimal (Figure 4), they result in almost identical real and inflation
outcomes, though by means of quite different interest rate paths.8 There is then clearly an advantage in
using a rule that respond to output relative to its steady state rather than its flexi-price level: the former
is observable and, when welfare-optimal, it turns out mimic the latter.
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that (i) for an empirically relevant degree of price stickiness, when a RBC à la Ravn
et al. (2006) is turned into a NK model and monetary policy is set optimally, the model delivers a
fiscal multiplier above one and the crowding-in effect on private consumption obtainable in a RBC; (ii)
an optimized simple Taylor-type interest-rate rule yield results close to optimal policy and dominates a
conventional Taylor rule; (iii) private consumption is crowded out and the fiscal multiplier experiences a
sizeable contraction if the Taylor rule negates the fiscal stimulus with an immediate and high response
to the output gap that, we show, is implausible from both a normative and positive perspective, or if
the government cannot commit; (iv) the original optimized Taylor rule responding to output relative to
its flexi-price level can be mimicked by an observable optimized rule responding to output relative to its
steady state.
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Figure 2: A government spending expansion under alternative monetary regimes
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Figure 3: A government spending expansion under Non-Optimal Taylor-Type Rules
0 10 20
−0.5
0
0.5
Inflation
0 10 20
−1
0
1
2
Output
0 10 20
−0.2
0
0.2
Nominal Interest0 10 20
−1
0
1
2
Hours worked 0 10 20
−0.2
0
0.2
Consumption
0 10 20
−1
0
1
2
Real Wage 0 10 20
−2
0
2
Investment
0 10 20
−2
0
2
Mark−up
0 10 20
−1
0
1
Output Gap
 
 
Taylor Rule on Output relative to Steady State Taylor Rule on Output Gap
Figure 4: A government spending expansion under Optimized Taylor-Type Rules
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